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Abstract
We examine the e¤ect of incorporation in stimulating small business investment.
Exploring a 2006 UK tax reform that lowered the tax gain to incorporation and reduced
the after-tax internal funds for small companies, we present three main results. First, a
one-percentage-point reduction in the tax gain decreased the number of new incorpora-
tions by 4.5 percent. Second, on average, a £ 1 reduction in the post-tax internal funds
of newly-incorporated rms would reduce their investment by 90 pence, consistent
with them facing severe nancial constraints. Third, this impact on investment gradu-
ally diminished after incorporation, consistent with incorporation improving access to
external nance.
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Many countries have used taxes to stimulate investment. For example, the United States,
Germany and the United Kingdom have all used forms of accelerated depreciation allowances
- sometimes targeted at smaller companies, and sometimes temporary - to encourage higher
investment.1 However, another potential channel for stimulating investment has received
little attention, which is to encourage businesses to incorporate. Greater incorporation could
lead to higher investment if incorporation helps to alleviate nancing constraints for small
businesses. This paper explores this possibility. We present empirical evidence based on a
2006 UK tax reform that created a substantial change in the incentive to incorporate for one
group of unincorporated rms. We use condential tax return data on the population of UK
companies, merged with nancial accounting data, to address three main questions. First,
to what extent do decisions by small rms to incorporate depend on the tax gain or loss
from incorporation? Second, does incorporation improve access to external nance? And
third, even for rms that incorporate primarily for tax reasons, would a reduction in the tax
liability lead to higher investment in the short to medium term?
We present evidence that, in the UK, the tax gain from incorporation has a signicant
impact on incorporation decisions. We also present evidence that newly incorporated rms
face nancial constraints to their investment, but that these constraints gradually diminish
after incorporation, consistent with them gradually gaining greater access to external nance.
On average, a £ 1 reduction in the corporation tax liability induces newly incorporated rms
to increase their investment by 90 pence, although the size of this response declines as the
period since incorporation lengthens, and access to external nance improves. We further
nd that all newly incorporated rms - even those that appear to be more motivated by tax
minimization - tend to respond to lower taxes by increasing their investment.
In the UK, incorporated rms (hereafter, companies) face di¤erent regulatory and tax
requirements compared to unincorporated rms. First, they are obliged to register the new
company with Companies House, providing - and keeping up to date - information on the
companys name, registered address, the names and addresses of directors, and details of
shareholders and share capital.2 Second, they are obliged to le with Companies House at
least basic nancial accounts on an annual basis. All this information is publicly and easily
available. Third, they are obliged to pay corporation tax on the companys prot; there may
also be personal income tax due on dividends paid to shareholders. Note that in the UK
there is no equivalent to US S-corps, which have look-through tax treatment, attributing
prot to shareholders who are taxed under the personal income tax.3
1For recent empirical evidence on the impact of these incentives, see, for example, Zwick and Mahon
(2016) for the US and Ma¢ ni, Xing and Devereux (2016) for the UK.
2Companies House is the United Kingdoms registrar of companies and is an executive agency and trading
fund of Her Majestys Government.
3Other types of entity exist - for example, limited partnerships. However, we exclude these from our
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For at least two reasons, banks may prefer to lend to companies rather than unincor-
porated rms. First, incorporation reduces the information asymmetry between the small
business and its lenders. The regular disclosure of company information to the public in-
creases transparency to external investors and other stakeholders (Healy and Palepu, 2001).
Through incorporation, the government becomes an implicit guarantor of the quality of the
information for the new company, thereby improving the credibility of its nancial state-
ments and signaling a higher quality of information. Second, the greater formality and costs
involved in being incorporated can help to signal a long-term commitment of the business
and enhance its reputation.4 Such reputation gains can potentially mitigate the conict of
interest between borrowers and lenders and lead to a lower cost of external nance (Diamond,
1989).5 Both factors become more signicant the longer the rm has been incorporated - as
more information becomes available, and the longer the rm has had to operate in a more
formal setting.6 As a preliminary step, we quantify the negative association between a rm
having corporate form and the likelihood of it failing to obtain external nance, using data
from surveys in 2008 and 2009 of the nances of UK small and medium sized rms (SMEs).
Conditioning on rm size, age and the industry sector, incorporation reduces the probability
of being denied access to su¢ cient external nance by over 12 percentage points.7
We formalize this positive e¤ect of incorporation in stimulating small business investment
in a simple pecking order model of corporate nance. In the model, the cost of external
nance is higher than that of internal nance.8 Incorporation lowers the cost of external
nance by reducing the information asymmetry between the small rm and its lender. In
this context, a reduction in the corporation tax rate has two e¤ects on small rms. First,
analysis.
4Freedman and Godwin (1992) reports that small business owners in the UK often quote the greater
credibility associated with the limited company status, which indicated that the business was serious, as
one of the key factors that inuence their choice of legal form.
5Of course, there are other important advantages of incorporation such as limited liability and separation
of ownership and control. But the value of limited liability can be quite restricted for small companies, as
they are commonly required to provide personal security as collateral for commercial borrowing. In a recent
survey of SME nance, more than 70 percent of newly incorporated rms in the UK were required to provide
personal security on loans and overdrafts above a modest level. In the U.S., nearly 70% of commercial
and industrial loans to small businesses are made on a secured basis (Berger and Udell, 1990). The same
argument extends to separation of ownership and control. It is less likely to benet most private companies
given that 45 percent of all UK companies are managed by the owner and that 90 percent of them have less
than 10 employees(BIS, 2015).
6Banks may also benet from building a relationship with new companies, requiring them to provide
additional private information or to operate in certain ways (Petersen and Rajan, 1994).
7This empirical evidence is corroborated by cross-country evidence that corporations report fewer nan-
cing and growth obstacles than unincorporated rms in 52 countries (Demirguc-Kunt, Love and Maksimovic,
2006).
8The observed cash-sensitivity of investment may also arise in the presence of agency costs, where the
decision to spend a marginal unit of internally generated funds is consistent with the utility maximization
problem of top management (Jensen, 1986). We do not consider this case as it is less relevant in the sample
of small, owner-managed rms on which we focus here.
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a lower average tax rate a¤ects the choice of legal form, by increasing the tax gain from
incorporation. This implies that some rms that were previously unincorporated will choose
to incorporate. Second, the lower corporate tax rate a¤ects corporate investment through
two channels. Ceteris paribus, the cost of capital would fall, creating an additional incentive
to invest. In addition, for companies that have exhausted internal nance, the lower tax
payment would increase their internal funds to nance investment. We call this the cash
ow e¤ect of the tax on investment, which arises with a nine month lag due to the UK rules
for when small companies must le and pay corporation tax. We show that the cash ow
e¤ect of the tax is strongest for newly incorporated rms and diminishes over the period of
incorporation with improved access to external nance.
Our empirical analysis uses rich data from UK corporation tax records from 2002/03
to 2008/09. The dataset provides detailed information on UK companies and their tax
positions and facilitates a precise identication of companies who were a¤ected by a 2006/07
tax reform. By replacing a progressive marginal tax schedule with a at rate of 19 percent for
small companies,9 the 2006 reform increased the average tax rate and liability for companies
with taxable prot up to £ 50,000. This led to a reduction in the tax gain from incorporation
for such small businesses.10 The increase in tax liability also implied a reduction in the
after-tax cash ow available for investment for companies that were nancially constrained.
We conduct our empirical analysis in two steps. First, we identify the causal e¤ect of tax
incentives on the incorporation decision of small rms in a di¤erence-in-di¤erences design
in xed-e¤ects non-linear count models, using the post-2006 period where the tax rate was
the same for all small rms to form a counterfactual of the distribution of taxable prots
had there been no tax advantage of incorporation before 2006. The di¤erence-in-di¤erences
estimates indicate that the number of newly incorporations increases by around 4 percent
for a one percentage point increase in the tax gain from incorporation. This basic nding is
robust to a number of alternative specications, the inclusion of additional control variables,
the exclusion of a bunching region where companies may manipulate their level of taxable
prots, and industry-level regressions controlling for industry-specic invariant unobservables
and time-varying characteristics. We further identify a group of companies in which their
owner-manager minimizes the total tax liability, and nd that the tax minimizersare more
responsive to changes in the tax gain. This di¤erence suggests that tax minimizers are
fully aware of the tax system and are more likely to benet from the tax incentives.
9Prior to 2006, companies paid no tax on the rst £ 10,000 of corporate prot. The marginal tax rate is
23.75 percent on the next £ 40,000 and 19 percent for prots between £ 50,000 and £ 300,000.
10For virtually all companies, the corporation tax liability was lower than the equivalent amount of tax that
they would have paid had they not been incorporated. This was also true even when taxation of dividends
was included in the comparison. Hence there was generally a tax gain from incorporation, unlike in many
other countries.
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Second, we identify the positive e¤ect of incorporation on small rm investment in a
dynamic investment model. We nd that an exogenous increase in corporate tax payment
(based on prot arising in the previous period, but a¤ecting cash ows in the current period)
leads to a reduction in rm investment. Identication relies on the cross-section variation
across small companies with taxable prots below £ 50,000 that were primarily a¤ected by
the 2006 tax reform, which allows a within-year comparison of investment for companies in
di¤erent prot bands. We nd that on average, small companies allocate 20 pence of a £ 1
reduction in their taxes to investment. More importantly, newly incorporated rms allocate
90 pence of a £ 1 tax saving to investment. This is consistent with them facing serious
nancial constraints, which gradually diminish after incorporation.
We perform a wide range of robustness checks. For example, to test whether duration
post-incorporation is not merely a proxy for total rm age, we control for characteristics of
the rm at the point of incorporation. We show that the e¤ect of duration post-incorporation
dominates that of pre-incorporation period. We also control for other factors that may a¤ect
the relationship between investment and available internal funds, and which may also be
correlated with duration post-incorporation, such as rm protability and its growth rate.
Our results suggest that the nancial constraints faced by newly incorporated compan-
ies diminish over the period since incorporation. Since a relaxation of nancial constraints
supports greater investment, the evidence is consistent with incorporation ultimately stimu-
lating investment. However, it might be objected that a tax incentive to incorporation may
induce incorporation by rms that do not seek to grow and invest, but are instead concerned
primarily with the tax gain. We address this concern by examining whether the group of
tax minimizersbehave di¤erently to other companies with respect to investment, and nd
that they allocate similar amount of tax savings to investment as the non-minimizers.
By identifying the positive e¤ect of incorporation on small business investment, our em-
pirical ndings shed new light on the di¤erent channels through which a lower corporation
tax rate can stimulate investment. First, it induces more rms to incorporate. Second, it
leads to greater investment by small companies, including those induced to incorporate by
the additional tax saving. In the short and medium term this occurs through a large part of
additional cash saved from a lower corporation tax payment for additional investment. In the
longer run it occurs through reducing the cost of external nance, so that the availability of
internal funds becomes less important for more established companies. Understanding this
positive relationship between incorporation and investment has important policy implica-
tions, given the number of government programs aiming to promote small business activities
through nancial and scal subsidies.
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature in corporate nance and investment.
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First, it complements the literature on nancial constraints and corporate investment.11 We
nd that incorporation stimulates small business investment and that the incentive e¤ects
of incorporation are most pronounced for newly incorporated rms facing a higher level of
information asymmetries (Petersen and Rajan, 1994). Second, our paper relates to a large
empirical literature that has found signicant e¤ects of corporate tax policy on business
investment (Cummins et al., 1994; Caballero, Engel and Haltiwanger, 1995; House and Sha-
piro, 2008; Yagan, 2015; Zwick and Mahon, 2016), and a smaller literature on taxation and
the choice of organizational form (Gordon and Slemrod, 2000; Goolsbee, 2004; Liu, 2014).
Third, it complements the literature on rm dynamics and investment (Cooley and Quadrini,
2001; Clementi and Hopenhayn, 2006), by relating the empirical regularity between company
age and investment to the underlying determinants of nancing costs.
Our paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 documents the empirical connection between
incorporation and access to external nance. Section 2 outlines a conceptual framework
to consider the impact of incorporation on rm investment. Section 3 describes the 2006
tax reform. Section 4 introduces the linked tax-accounting data. Section 5 estimates the
e¤ect of tax incentives on incorporation. Section 6 estimates the impact of incorporation on
investment. Section 7 concludes.
1 Incorporation Facilitates Access of External Finance
We start by providing descriptive evidence consistent with the hypothesis that incorporation
facilitates access to external nance for small and medium sized rms (SMEs), by document-
ing that there is a negative association between having corporate form and the likelihood
of failure in securing external nance. The data we use are from recent surveys of SMEs
nances in the UK in 2008 and 2009,12 which includes 2,452 SMEs with detailed informa-
tion on the availability of credit, the types of nance used and basic rm and balance sheet
characteristics.13 Around 47% of rms in the sample either applied for external nance or
indicated a consideration to do so in the past three years, but the rate of success varies
considerably.14 In particular, around 19 percent of rms that sought external nance failed
11The early empirical work on corporate investment, e.g. Meer and Kuh (1957), stressed the availability of
nance. Inuential empirical work by Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) suggested that heterogeneity in
the sensitivity of investment to cash ow for rms with nancial constraint is related to the cost premium for
external nance. Subsequent studies have made this argument while identifying quasi-experimental variation
in cash ows or credit supply (Lamont, 1997; Rauh, 2006; Chaney, Sraer and Thesmar, 2012; Zwick and
Mahon, 2016).
12Surveys in both years conducted by Warwick Business School. For more information see
http://www.esds.ac.uk/doc/6314/read6314.htm.
13The basic descriptive data for these rms are summarized in Appendix Table B.1.
14We use three indicators to evaluate whether a SME has failed to obtain any external nance: Denied,
Depressed, and Discouraged. The indicator Denied takes value of 1 if the SME applied to a bank or nancial
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to obtain su¢ cient external nance.15
For small rms, having corporate form is a key factor in lowering the probability of
failure in obtaining external nance. We identify this important association by estimating
the likelihood of failure in accessing external nance in a probit model:
yit = 1 + 2LLCi + 3Ageit + 4LLCi  Ageit + 5Xit + t + it; (1)
where yit denotes various outcome indicators in obtaining external nance. The key variable
of interest is LLCi; which is a dummy variable and takes the value of 1 for limited liability
companies and zero for other, non-corporate ownership type.16 The variable Ageit is the
number of years since the rm was established, Xit are other rm-level controls including the
size of the business approximated by total asset and a set of 2-digit SIC industry dummies.
The latter is included to control, for example, for the fact that di¤erent industries are
associated with a di¤erent degree of asset tangibility and borrowing capacity. t is a set of
year dummies and it is the error term. We estimate equation (1) in a probit regression
by pooling all the rms that have applied for or considered applying for external nance in
2008 and 2009. We cluster standard errors at the rm level to control for potential serial
correlation of errors.
Table 1 presents the average marginal e¤ects estimated from the probit model of (1). The
dependent variable in column (1) is the overall likelihood of failure in obtaining su¢ cient
external nance. Evaluated at the mean, having a corporate form reduces the probability of
failing to raise su¢ cient external nance by 12 percentage points. The e¤ect of rm age (the
number of years in business) is considerably weaker one more year in business, on average,
decreases the probability of being denied for external nance by 0.3 percentage points.17
The estimated marginal e¤ect of the interaction term between LLC and rm age is similar
to that of rm age but takes the opposite sign, suggesting that the benet of being older
almost disappears at the time of incorporation.
institution for any overdraft or commercial lending and was turned down outright, and 0 otherwise. The
indicator Depressed equals 1 if the SME was o¤ered less than what was requested for external nance, and
0 otherwise. The indicator Discouraged equals 1 if the SME did not apply for any external nance in the
fear of being turned down, and 0 otherwise. We further combine the information in the three indicators
by summing them up to an indicator of overall failure, which takes value of 1 if any of the three indicators
equals to 1.
15We test whether rm characteristics of the two subsamples have equal means and report the t statistic
and p-value in Appendix Table B.1 columns (10) and (11). Firms in need of external nance are more
likely to be a limited liability company (LLC) and have higher turnover and total asset, but they are not
statistically di¤erent in age or employment. A small number of rms reported the total interest rate charged
on their loans, and the average interest rate is not statistically di¤erent between the two groups.
16Non-corporate businesses include sole proprietorship, partnership, limited liability partnership and other
forms. They account for about 43 percent of rms in the sample.
17Note that the age variable is the total number of years in establishment and does not capture the
duration since incorporation.
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The next three columns report a qualitatively similar e¤ect of incorporation on individual
indicators of failure: Denied, Depressed, and Discouraged, respectively. Evaluated at the
mean, incorporation reduces the probability of an application for external nance being
denied by 5 percentage points (column (2)), the probability of obtaining less external nance
than requested by 3 percentage points (column (3)),18 and the probability of discouraging
an application by about 3 percentage points (column (4)).
The strong and negative correlation between incorporation and the likelihood of failure
in obtaining su¢ cient external nance indicates that having corporate form enhances ac-
cess of external nance by SMEs in the UK. Given this positive cross-sectional association
between incorporation and improved access to external nance, we now formalize the e¤ect
of incorporation on rm investment in a simple pecking order model.
2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we present a simple conceptual framework in which incorporation reduces
the cost of external nance and encourages small companies to undertake more investment.
Consider a rm that aims to maximize its shareholder value, Vt, dened as
Vt = Dt + E(Vt+1) (2)
where  is the shareholders discount factor,  = 1=(1 + ), and  is the shareholders
discount rate. For an unincorporated business, Dt is the cash taken out of the business by
the owner in period t. For a company it is the dividend paid to the shareholder in period t.
We assume that the owner of the rm has no other wealth to invest in the business, and also
has no access to equity nance. Investment must therefore be nanced by retained earnings
or borrowing.
The dividend, or cash removed from the business, is equal to
Dt = F (Kt 1)  It +Bt   [1 + r (xt 1; Bt 1)]Bt 1   Tt (3)
where F (Kt 1) is the value of the rms output, which depends on the capital stock at the
end of the previous period, Kt 1, It is new investment in period t, Bt is new one-period debt
issued in period t. The rate of interest on debt is a decreasing function of the information
that banks have about the business at the beginning of the period, xt 1, rx < 0 and an
increasing function of the amount of debt, rB > 0. For simplicity, we assume that rBB = 0.
However, we assume that rBx = @rB=@x < 0 - that is, the rate of increase in the interest rate
18The e¤ect of incorporation on the probability of obtaining less external nance than requested is impre-
cisely estimated, however.
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with respect to the level of debt is moderated by incorporation. This is because complying
with the regulation for companies to produce annual accounting information increases the
formality of the business and also increases the credible information available to banks, partly
because of an implicit government guarantee on the quality of the information. Both factors
reduce the interest rate through xt. Further, we assume that the longer the period of such
compliance the more credible information is available, and ceteris paribus, the higher is xt.19
Tt is taxation, dened as
Tt =  fF (Kt 1)  Kt 1   r (xt 1; Bt 1)Bt 1g : (4)
The rate of depreciation relief for capital expenditure is assumed for simplicity to be equal
to the true depreciation rate, . The equation of motion of the capital stock is Kt =
(1  )Kt 1 + It.
There is a minimum level of dividends, Dt; this could be zero, or it could be positive
reecting constraints on the owners need for income from the rm. Debt is non-negative.
Hence
Dt  Dt (5)
Bt  0 (6)
and there are shadow values associated with these constraints of Dt and 
B
t , respectively.
We assume throughout that Dt+1 > 0 and so 
D
t+1 = 0.
The rm chooses Kt and Bt to maximize Vt. The rst order conditions are
Kt : 1 + 
D
t =  fFK(Kt)(1  ) + (1  (1  ))g (7)
Bt : 1 + 
D
t + 
B
t =  f1 + [r (xt; Bt) + rBBt] (1  )g (8)
There are two nancial regimes.
Regime 1: The rm pays dividends and investment is nanced at the margin by retained
earnings: Dt = 0; 
B
t > 0.
In this case, the marginal cost of debt nance is
1 + [r (xt; Bt) + rB] (1  ) =
 
1 + Bt

(1 + ) (9)
which we assume exceeds the cost of using retained earnings and so Bt = 0. In this case,
19This approach can be seen as a simple version of the set of models explored by Tirole (2006). To focus on
the impact of incorporation we do not explicitly model the reasons why external nance is more expensive,
which are examined in detail by Tirole. Instead, these factors are simply summarised by x.
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the rm undertakes investment up to the point at which the marginal product of capital is
equal to the standard user cost of capital, given this simplied tax system:
FK(Kt) =

(1  ) + : (10)
Regime 2: The rm pays the minimum dividend and investment is nanced at the
margin by borrowing : Dt > 0; 
B
t = 0.
In this case, from (8) we have
 
1 + Dt

(1 + ) = 1 + [r (xt; Bt) + rBBt] (1  ) (11)
and so investment is undertaken up to the point at which
FK(Kt) = r (xt; Bt) + rBBt +  (12)
In this case, both the cost of nance and the cost of depreciation are deductible from tax,
so the cost of capital is una¤ected by tax. However, despite the tax advantage to the use of
debt nance, we assume throughout that, due to informational constraints, r (xt 1; Bt 1) 
=(1  ) and so retained earnings is a cheaper source of nance than external debt.
2.1 Empirical strategy
Changing organizational form has two immediate consequences. First, we assume that,
ceteris paribus, companies have a higher xt - reecting greater rm reputation and inform-
ation available to lenders; that is xCt > x
U
t , where a C superscript indicates corporate form
and a U superscript indicates unincorporated form. Second, we also assume - consistent with
the UK tax system - that the tax rate for companies (C) is lower than that for unincorpor-
ated businesses (U); C < U . In our empirical work we investigate the impact of these two
factors on the incorporation decision and on investment.
Leaving to one side any behavioral responses by the rm, both of these factors tend
to increase rm value - the former through a lower borrowing rate and the latter through
a lower tax rate. While we do not explicitly model the choice of organizational form, we
investigate empirically whether the number of newly incorporated rms is related to the
potential tax gains. Assuming that there are xed costs of incorporation (F ), unincorporated
businesses will only incorporate if the potential gains from incorporation exceed these xed
costs, V Ct   V Ut > F . This is more likely for rms where the tax gain to incorporation is
greater.
There are three possible channels by which changes in xt and  may a¤ect rm investment.
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First, conditional on being in Regime 1, there is a straightforward e¤ect through the cost of
capital as a result of facing a lower tax rate. Totally di¤erentiating (10) yields
FKKdKt =

(1  )2d : (13)
This is the normal case: given FKK < 0, a reduction in the tax rate reduces the costs
of capital, and so increases investment and the capital stock. This e¤ect occurs when the
rm has enough internal resources to nance its investment, and so the availability and cost
of external nance is irrelevant. In the UK, since C < U incorporation should lead to a
lower cost of capital and hence higher investment. However, in countries where C > U ,
the reverse should hold. This channel by which incorporation a¤ects investment therefore
varies between countries depending on the relative tax rates. We therefore focus primarily
on the more general channels described below.
In regime 2, there are two e¤ects. One is the direct impact of a rise in xt on the interest
rate charged, which reduces the cost of capital in this regime. The second comes from a lower
rate of taxation increasing available internal funds. This would make it more likely that the
rm would be in Regime 1, able to nance its investment without hitting the dividend
constraint. Further, conditional on remaining in Regime 2, additional internal funds would
enable the company to borrow less and hence face a lower interest rate and lower cost of
capital. In practice, taxes are paid 9 months after the accounting year end, so for a given
prot in period t   1, a switch to corporate form in period t   1 would induce a change in
tax and hence borrowing in period t. Hence, in this case, dBt = dIt + dTt 1 = dKt + dTt 1.
Using this, totally di¤erentiating (12) (and recalling that rBB = 0) yields
(FKK   2rB) dKt = (rx + rBxBt) dxt + 2rBdTt 1: (14)
The change in xt therefore has a direct positive e¤ect on investment through reducing
the cost of borrowing (since rB > 0; rx < 0; rBx < 0). In addition, a reduction in the tax
liability from t  1, paid in period t, also has a positive e¤ect on investment. The size of this
latter e¤ect also depends on xt, through rB(xt; Bt). Specically,
@ (dKt=dTt 1)
@xt
=
2rBxFKK
(FKK   2rB)2
> 0: (15)
That is, in Regime 2 a rise in xt tends to reduce the sensitivity of investment to tax payments
(since dKt=dTt 1 < 0).
Our empirical strategy for investment primarily tests the third hypothesis in equation
(15), that a rise in xt tends to reduce the sensitivity of investment to tax payments.20 This
20We cannot directly test the proposition that, ceteris paribus, a corporation undertakes higher investment
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is done in two steps. We rst test whether an exogenous increase in the tax payment has the
negative e¤ect on investment predicted in (14). We then use as a proxy for xt the duration
of the period since the company became incorporated, on the grounds that the longer is
this period, the greater the information available to banks, and the longer the company
has had to establish a reputation. We test the e¤ect of this proxy on the impact of the
increase in the tax payment on investment, by estimating whether the e¤ect diminishes the
longer the duration of the period since the company incorporated, as predicted in equation
(15). Our empirical test controls for the other two channels described here, by including
the cost of capital and the proxy for xt separately in the estimation, and relies primarily on
the quasi-experimental variation in tax savings to identify the e¤ect of the incorporation on
investment.21
3 The Policy Experiment
As in many other countries, the tax treatment of small business income in the UK depends
on legal form.22 Prots generated by non-corporate businesses, including sole proprietorships
and partnerships, are passed through to their owners and are liable for income taxes and
national insurance contributions (NICs). In comparison, prots generated in companies are
rst taxed at the corporate level and then taxed for a second time at the shareholder level as
distributed dividends which are liable for dividend taxes with a partial credit for corporation
tax paid. Total taxes for self-employment income, including NIC contributions, are often
considerably higher than that for corporate income. A key feature of small companies in the
UK is that there is often no distinction between the owner and the manager. In this case
the distinction between business and personal income is less clear since income can be paid
out to the owner-manager as a salary and therefore be liable for income taxes and NICs.23
The zero starting rate, which exempted the rst £ 10,000 of corporate prot from tax,
was introduced in 2002/03 as one of the key measures to bringing down the barriers to
enterprise and to support the drivers of productivity growth (HM Treasury and HMRC,
than an equivalent unincorporated business, since we have data only on corporations.
21Note that we cannot identify the direct impact of the duration since incorporation on investment. To
see this, note that the total age of the company (Ait) equals the rm age at the point of incorporation (Ii)
plus the number of years since incorporation (xit), i.e. Ait = Ii + xit. By including a company xed e¤ect
in the regression, the marginal impact of xit is indistinguishable from that of Ait. In any case, other factors
which vary over the rm life cycle may also a¤ect investment (Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and Clementi
and Hopenhayn (2006)) and may confound the direct e¤ects of information and reputation that we aim to
identify.
22The denition of the tax base, including the tax treatment of capital allowance and interest deductibility,
is broadly the same for incorporated and unincorporated businesses in the UK.
23According to ONS statistics, more than 40% of companies in the UK are owner-managed.
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2002).24 It provided sizable tax savings for small businesses that incorporated, which led
the government to subsequently restrict the benet of the zero starting rate to prots that
were retained by the company in 2004.25 The zero starting rate was eventually replaced
with a at rate of 19 percent for corporate prots up to £ 300,000 in 2006/07. This resulted
di¤erential in changes in the average tax rates faced by small companies at di¤erent levels
of pre-tax prot. As illustrated in panel A of Figure 1, the tax reform increased the average
tax rate only for small companies with taxable prots up to £ 50,000. The size of the tax
rate increase is continuously decreasing in the pre-tax prot, so that the largest increase is
for companies with taxable prots below £ 10,000.
An important feature of the 2006/07 policy reform is that it embodied changes in the
marginal tax rate as well as in average tax rates. As shown in Figure 1 panel B, the marginal
tax rate increased from 0 to 19% for companies with taxable prot up to £ 10,000, decreased
from 23.75% to 19% for companies with taxable prot between £ 10,000 and £ 50,000. In
contrast with the continuous change in the average tax rate, there is a stepwise increase in
the marginal tax rate for corporate prots up to £ 50,000.
4 Data
The analysis in this paper uses a comprehensive dataset to study business incorporation
and investment. The dataset is based on administrative corporation tax returns covering
the population of companies in the UK between 2002/03 and 2008/09.26 The full tax data-
set has around 10.7 million observations for 2.5 million individual companies (both private
and public) and contains detailed and precise information on taxable prots and how they
are determined. Because of the detailed information, we can identify precisely how rms
incorporation and investment incentives are a¤ected by the policy reform. We merge the
tax record with company accounts in the Financial Analysis Made Easy (FAME) database
provided by Bureau van Dijk.27 The accounting records provide additional rm-level inform-
ation on the amount of total xed assets, the number of employees, directorsrenumeration,
24A 10% starting rate, which taxed the rst £ 10,000 corporate prots at 10%, had been introduced in
1999/2000 and remained in e¤ect until being replaced by the zero starting rate.
25Prots paid out as dividends in the next two years were e¤ectively taxed at the standard small companies
rate, removing the main tax advantage for individuals to replace one form of cash income (salary) by another
(dividend income).
26The nancial year for corporation tax runs from 1 April to 31 March in the UK. The nancial year for
an individual corporate tax return is based on its nancial period end.
27FAME covers all the registered rms in the UK that are legally required to le accounts with the
Companies House. Overall, FAME provides basic information on all companies including registered address,
rm status, and industry code, although the availability of nancial information varies across rm sizes. We
are able to match the tax return and company account for each company-year for approximately 90% of
corporate taxpayers.
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and the exact date of incorporation.
4.1 Data for Incorporation Analysis
The dataset we use for incorporation analysis is based on all companies that were newly
incorporated between 2002/03 and 2008/09. We focus on standalone domestic businesses
and exclude companies that belong to a larger group or report foreign earnings. We compute
the annual distribution of the pre-tax prots of new companies by counting the number of
new companies in income bins of £ 100 for each year during the sample period. The aim is to
explore whether there is any systematic change in the distribution of the new companies in
relation to changes in the tax saving from incorporation as a result of the 2006 tax reform.
We also compute the average characteristics of newly incorporated companies within each
income bin including their turnover, xed assets, and the number of workers as proxies for
other non-tax determinants of incorporation.
An advantage of linking the tax and accounting data is that for about 12 percent of
companies we observe the amount of remuneration received by the director(s), i.e. a proxy
of their personal income, from company accounts. This additional information enables us
to construct a measure of total taxable income of the company, as the sum of its corporate
taxable prot and the amount of salary paid to directors. We can then identify whether the
allocation of total prot between business and personal income minimizes the overall tax
liability of the company. Given that the marginal tax rate for salary is consistently higher
than that for corporate prot, companies can minimize their overall tax liability by declaring
a salary equal to the personal allowance for income tax and the reminder as corporate prot.
We identify a company as a tax minimizerif it follows this tax-minimization strategy, i.e.
companies that bunch below the personal allowance threshold in Figure 4. The percentage of
tax minimizers is around 45 percent for all rms with total taxable prots below £ 100,000,
and around 14 percent for all rms with corporate prots below £ 300,000.
4.2 Data for Investment Analysis
The dataset that we use to analyze the link between incorporation and investment is an un-
balanced panel of standalone companies which undertook some positive investment between
2002/03 and 2008/09 and reported taxable prots of less than £ 300,000.28 We call this the
main investors sample. We use total qualifying expenditure for plant and machinery repor-
ted in the tax form to measure investment Iit. We scale Iit by beginning-of-period book
28We further restrict our sample to small companies with up to 500 employees. The total number of
observations dropped based on taxable prot and employment account for around for 4.7 percent of the
linked tax-accounting dataset.
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value of xed asset Kit 1 to obtain a measure of investment rate (Iit=Kit 1).
Due to the nine-month lag between the accounting year end and the tax payment due
date, an increase in the current-year average tax rate would reduce tax payment and available
cash for small companies in the following year. Given this lag in tax payment, we calculate
the rm-level average tax rate in year t  1 (avgi;t 1), as the observed tax liability in year t  1
relative to taxable prot Ti;t 1, 
avg
i;t 1 = Taxi;t 1=
T
i;t 1. In addition to changes in average
tax rates, the 2006 tax reform also changed the marginal tax rate and the after-tax cost of
capital for companies with taxable prots below £ 50,000. To control for the latter e¤ect, we
compute a measure of Jorgenson and Hall (1967) rm-level user cost of capital.29 Table 2
presents some basic features of the key variables.30
We use three di¤erent samples to assess the robustness of our ndings to sample selection
The main investor sample includes rms that invested at least once during the sample
period and accounts for 67 percent of total observations in the linked tax-accounting dataset.
The frequent investor sample, which includes companies that invested in more than half of
the periods throughout their lifetime during the sample period, accounts for 70 percent of
observations in the investor sample. The consistent investor sample includes companies that
invested consistently throughout their lifetime during the sample period and accounts for 20
percent of observations in the investor sample.
5 The Causal E¤ect of Tax Incentives on Incorporation
5.1 Changing Tax Incentives for Incorporation
To illustrate changes in the tax incentives to incorporate following the abolition of the zero
starting rate, Figure 2 presents two series of the tax gain from incorporation around the time
of reform. The tax gain from incorporation is expressed as the di¤erence between the average
tax rate for £ 1 corporate prot and the average tax rate charged had the same income been
earned in an unincorporated business, i.e. avgU   avgC . At a given level of pre-tax income, a
positive di¤erence between the two rates represents positive tax savings from incorporation.
The calculation of the tax gain takes di¤erent assumption on how corporate earnings
are paid out. First, panel A assumes that all the corporate prots are retained within the
company or paid out as dividends to basic-rate taxpayer owners. Two things are worth
noting. First, it is evident that across all years in the sample period, there is positive tax
saving from incorporation except at the very low income level. Second, the abolition of the
29We describe the calculation of the user cost of capital in details in Appendix Section A.
30Note that by using the marginal tax rate corresponding to the observed prot level in a given period
we introduce potential measurement error in the cost of capital for companies that are not persistently in a
tax-loss or tax-paying position.
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zero starting rate introduced di¤erential changes to the tax gain from incorporation, with the
largest reduction in the tax gain occurring to small rms with taxable prots up to £ 50,000
and particularly those with taxable prot below £ 20,000. In contrast, there is very little
change in the tax gain for those above £ 50,000. We exploit this di¤erential change in the tax
gains across di¤erent levels of taxable income to identify the causal e¤ect of tax incentives
on incorporation.31
To examine how far dividend taxes for higher-rate taxpayers reduce the tax gain from
incorporation, panel B assumes that all corporate prots are paid out to higher-rate share-
holders. Overall, the level of tax gains is slightly lower for incomes above the basic taxpayer
bracket, due to the 25 percent dividend tax faced by higher-rate taxpayers. There remains
to be positive tax gain from incorporation at most income levels. The qualitative impact
of the tax reform on the tax gain from incorporation remains the same, with a signicant
reduction occurring to small rms with taxable income up to £ 50,000 and minimum changes
to those with income above £ 50,000.
5.2 Graphical Evidence
Figure 3 compares the distribution of newly incorporated rms by prot bins of £ 1,000
before and after the abolition of the zero starting rate, and demonstrates that changes in
the number of newly incorporated companies are strikingly consistently with changes in the
tax gains to incorporate. First, there is a noticeable reduction in the number of new com-
panies from 2002/3-2003/4 to 2006/7-2007/8 mainly for companies with taxable prot up to
£ 50,000.32 The largest decrease in the number of new incorporations is concentrated between
£ 0-£ 20,000, an income region with the most signicant reduction in the tax gain from in-
corporation. In contrast, in the £ 50,000-£ 100,000 income range with no substantial changes
in the tax gains to incorporate, the number of new incorporations remained stable around
the time of policy change. Graphically, there is strong evidence that decrease in the tax
savings from incorporation had some negative impact on the number of newly incorporated
companies after the 2006/07 policy reform.
5.3 Empirical Methodology
To identify the causal e¤ect of tax incentives on small business incorporation, we analyze
changes in the distribution of taxable prot of newly incorporated companies due to changes
31Note that the subsequent reduction in the tax gains to incorporate at all income levels are due to an
annual increase of 1 percent in the small company rate since 2007/08.
32The reduction in the number of new incorporations started from 2004/5 when the NCDR was in place
to restrict the extent of tax-motivated incorporation.
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in the tax gain from doing so. Specically, we use the post-2006 period where the tax rate
became the same for all small companies to form a counterfactual of the distribution in the
absence of di¤erences in tax between rms. We compare this counterfactual to the distribu-
tion of prots of companies that incorporated before 2006 when the average tax rate varied
continuously between rms. To control for changes in the number of new incorporations
due to non-tax reasons, we use the distribution of companies with taxable prots between
£ 50,000 and £ 100,000 as a control group. There is little change in the tax saving from
incorporation for companies in the control group, and therefore changes in the number of
new incorporations in the control group are mainly driven by non-tax reasons and can be
di¤erenced out from changes in incorporation in the treatment group to identify the impact
of taxes.
Quantitatively, we estimate the conditional expectation of new incorporations as a func-
tion of the tax gain from incorporation and other observable characteristics in the following
form:
E(citjTax Gainit; Xit) = exp(i + t + taxTax Gainit + xXit); (16)
where cit is the number of newly incorporated businesses in income bin i of £ 100 at time t,
i is a set of income bin dummies to control for the e¤ect of rm size on the choice of legal
form, and t is a full set of year dummies to capture macroeconomic shocks that are common
to all companies in the same year. The key variable of interest, Tax Gainit, represents the
tax saving from incorporation as a percentage of pre-tax prot i at time t.33 An additional
error term, which represents temporary uctuations in the unobserved determinants of in-
corporation, enters equation (16) additively in the log linear model or multiplicatively in
maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).34 Importantly, tax can be consistently interpreted
33It may be the case that rms instead evaluate the tax gain over their subsequent lifetime. In general, the
tax gain (as a percentage of prot) in the rst year may over- or under-estimate the lifetime gain. However,
if rms expect to grow, Figure 2 shows that their tax gain in subsequent years will tend to be lower than in
the rst year. In this case, our estimated tax e¤ect would be a lower bound on the true sensitivity of the
number of newly incorporated rms with respect to the tax gain from incorporation.
34We use four di¤erent specications to account for the discrete nature and skewed distribution of cit.
First, we take the natural log of the discrete counts and estimate the log transformation using Ordinary
Least Square (OLS):
ln cit = i + t + taxTax Gainit + xXit + "it:
We estimate tax using the standard xed e¤ect estimator, allowing for arbitrary correlation of the error
terms in the covariance matrix.
The next three regression models, including the Poisson Generalized Linear Model (GLM), the Negative
Binomial model (NB2), and the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PMLE) (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006;
Cameron and Trivedi, 2013), estimate cit in levels using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) with
di¤erent assumptions of the variance structure for cit. Specically, denote !i the conditional variance of cit.
The Poisson Generalized Linear Model allows a linear dependence of !i on i as !i = (1+)i; where  is a
scalar parameter that can be estimated empirically. The Negative Binomial model allows !i to depend on i
in a quadratic form as !i = i + 
2. In the most general case, the functional form of !i is left unspecied
in the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood estimator and the variance matrix is estimated using a robust
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throughout the log-linear and MLE specications as the semi-elasticity of the number of
newly incorporated companies with respect to the tax saving from incorporation.
5.4 Baseline Results
Table 3 summarizes the baseline regression results from the alternative econometric models.
The dependent variable in column (1) is the natural logarithm of number of newly incor-
porated rms by income bin and year, and the dependent variable in columns (2)-(4) is the
number of newly incorporated rms in levels. Each specication regresses the dependent
variable on the Tax Gainit variable and a set of rm-xed e¤ects and year xed e¤ects.
The upper and lower panel show the regression results with tax gains from retained earn-
ings (Tax Gainreit ) and from dividend income (Tax Gain
div
it ), respectively. In each panel,
the estimated tax coe¢ cient btax is remarkably similar across di¤erent columns. Consistent
with the theoretical consideration, we nd a positive and signicant e¤ect of the tax which
suggests that a higher tax gain to incorporate encourages more rms to incorporate.
Table 4 presents regression results using a set of specications based on the Poisson
Pseudo-MLE model and augmented in various ways as described below. All regressions in-
clude a full set of income bin dummies and year xed e¤ects and use the tax variable Tax
Gainreit calculated under the assumption that all prots are taxed as retained earnings.
35
Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are clustered at the income bin level. For com-
parison, column (1) presents the baseline results shown in Table 3 column (4) and does not
include any other explanatory variables. To assess the robustness of the strong e¤ect of the
tax gain to controlling for potential serial correlation in the non-tax sources of heterogen-
eity in incorporation, column (2) collapses the annual counts into four periods that capture
variation in the tax gains entirely driven by changes in average corporate tax rates.36 The
basic result is essentially unchanged.
Columns (3)-(5) assess the robustness of our ndings to the inuence of non-tax factors
in the choice of business form by controlling for the average of total sales, total assets and
number of workers for all newly incorporated rms in the corresponding income bin. These
variables capture the average size of the newly incorporated companies. Together with the
income bin xed e¤ects, the size variables allow us to better control for the e¤ect that rms
tend to incorporate as they grow larger and become more complex, perhaps also capturing
the potential benet of separation of ownership and control. This leaves the e¤ects of the
estimator.
35Regressions using Tax Gaindiv show very similar results.
36The four periods refer to the pre-reform period of 2002/03-2005/06 and the post-reform years of 2006/07,
2007/08, and 2008/09 during which there was an annual increase of 1 percent in the corporate main rate.
Specication in column (2) replaces the year xed e¤ects with a set of period xed e¤ects.
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tax gain unchanged.
Column six checks the robustness of our nding to bunching around the £ 10k kink point,
which represents a discrete jump in the marginal corporate tax rate from zero to 23.75
percent and induced large and sharp bunching of companies around the kink (Devereux,
Liu and Loretz, 2014) . This can clearly be seen in Figure 3, and so also applies to new
incorporations. Bunching around the kind point reects behavioral responses to variation in
the marginal tax rate, but to the extent that it also a¤ects the distribution of new companies,
the presence of bunching may indicate possible selection into the treatment group and a
reduction in the number of new companies that are right above the kink point. If this
is the case, there would be an upward bias in the estimated tax e¤ect. We thus exclude
observations in the bunching region, i.e. counts of newly incorporated companies between
£ 8,000 and £ 12,000 to ensure that the observed incorporation response is not entirely driven
by changes in the marginal tax rate that induced self-selection of bunchers into incorporation.
The results are presented in column (6) and conrm the previous ndings: the estimated
coe¢ cient on the tax gain remains positive, very similar, and statistically signicant.
To examine whether our nding is robust to potential heterogeneity in the xed cost of
incorporation that may vary across di¤erent industries, columns (7)-(9) replace the depend-
ent variable with industry-specic counts of newly incorporated companies (ln cijt), where j
denotes one of the 12 broad industry sectors based on 1-digit SIC code. Column (7) includes
a full set of industry xed e¤ects, columns (8) controls for additional industry-specic time
trends, and column (9) adds other non-tax control variables. The basic result again remains
quantitatively unchanged. Appendix Table B.2 further presents the estimated tax coe¢ -
cient (btax) from 12 individual industry-sector regressions.37 The results generally support
the view that tax savings exert a positive inuence on the incorporation decision of small
businesses across a wide range of industries.38
Throughout all the di¤erent specications, the coe¢ cient estimate for Tax Gainreit is
positive and statistically signicant at 1% level. Various robustness checks by collapsing
into broad time period, excluding the bunching regions, adding control variables or running
regressions at the industry level produce little or no changes on the estimated tax coe¢ cients.
Quantitatively, our preferred results from Table 4 column (7) suggest that a one percentage
point increase in the tax saving from incorporation increases the number of new companies by
4.3 percent, under the assumption that all prots are retained within the company. Should
all prots be distributed to higher rate shareholders and be liable for dividend taxes, a
37The regressions in Panel A and Panel B use Tax Gainreit and Tax Gain
div
it as the key variable to capture
the tax savings from incorporation, respectively.
38In the top panel of Table B.2, for example, we nd that btax has a positive sign for 11 of the 12 industry
sectors and is precisely estimated for nine of them. Only one industry has an estimated tax e¤ect that is
negative and that is statistically insignicant.
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one percentage point increase in the tax gain from incorporation raises the number of new
companies by around 2.2 percent.
5.5 Stronger Incorporation Response by Tax Minimizers
In this section, we examine incorporation responses in the sub sample of companies for which
we observe their total taxable income. There are two advantages of utilizing the additional
information on total income in this sample. First, there is less measurement error in the
tax gain from incorporation. This is because without knowing the amount of directors
remuneration, using corporate prot alone may underestimate the amount of total taxable
income earned by the owner of the small company. In this case, the true tax gain from
incorporation is measured with noise by the tax gain based on corporate prot. Second, as
discussed before, the additional information on directorsremuneration allows us to identify
companies that minimize their overall tax liability by declaring their personal income at the
personal allowance threshold. We record this information in a dummy variableMinimizerit,
which takes the value of 1 if company i engages in tax minimization in year t and zero
otherwise.
Table 5 summarizes the regression results using the Poisson PMLE model, with the tax
variable in the upper/lower panel capturing the gain from incorporation based on retained
earnings/dividend income.39 The dependent variable in all specications is the number of
newly incorporated businesses (cij;min) by the type of minimizers in income bin i and year j.
Column (1) adds the dummy indicator Minimizerit in equation (16). Column (2) performs
a di¤erence-in-di¤erences analysis by interacting the tax gain variable with the minimizer
dummy to capture any di¤erential e¤ect of the tax between the two groups. Column (3) and
(4) report regression results in the minimizersand non-minimizersubsample, allowing
the two groups to be di¤erentially a¤ected by shocks across di¤erent income bin and year.
All regressions include a set of income bin and year xed e¤ects.
Regression results in Table 5 reveal important heterogeneous e¤ects of taxes on incor-
poration. Column (1) in the upper panel conrms the positive and signicant e¤ect of the
tax gain on incorporation for companies with their tax incentives more precisely measured.
Column (2) reveals a stronger tax e¤ect for tax minimizers. Allowing for di¤erential e¤ects
of unobserved income bin and time heterogeneity between the two groups, the tax coe¢ -
cient for minimizersin column (3) is three times larger than that for non-minimizersin
39We compute two series of average tax rates on the observed total taxable income and on the same amount
of income had it been from an unincorporated business. The tax gain from incorporation is expressed as the
di¤erence between the two average tax rates and measures the amount of tax savings from incorporation
as a share of total income before taxation. Accounting for taxation of dividend income at the shareholder
level, we calculate two series of tax gains under the assumption that the corporate prot portion of the total
income is retained earnings and paid out as dividends, respectively.
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column (4). The results suggest that tax-sophisticated businesses are more responsive to the
tax incentives in choosing their legal form.40
6 Diminishing Financial Constraints by Incorporation
In this section we test the hypothesis that nancial constraints faced by small companies
diminish over time after they become incorporated. We begin by showing that small company
investment responds negatively to the lagged average tax rate, which we interpret as the
excess sensitivity of investment to tax cash ow. Next we show that the excess sensitivity of
investment to taxes diminishes with the duration of incorporation, which is consistent with
nancial constraints diminishing over time as newly incorporated businesses start to establish
a track record of formality and providing publicly available information that is more credible.
In particular, we show a similar e¤ect of incorporation on relaxing nancial constraints for
tax minimizersand non-minimizers, suggesting that incorporation stimulates investment
in companies that incorporated primarily to benet from large tax savings.
6.1 Empirical Specication and Identication
We employ the following empirical strategy to test our hypothesis. Consistent with the rst-
order conditions (10) and (12) in Section 2, we model investment in a exible error correction
model41:
Iit
Kit 1
= 0 + 1 lnYit   2 lnCoCit   (lnKit 1   lnYit 1    lnCoCit 1) (17)
+1
avg
i;t 1 + 2
avg
i;t 1  xit + dt + i + uit;
where Iit denotes rm-level gross investment by rm i in year t, Kit 1 denotes the beginning-
of-period capital stock, Yit the current output, CoCit the cost of capital, dt denotes a set of
year xed e¤ects and i denotes a set of rm xed e¤ects that allow us to control for unob-
served time-invariant heterogeneity such as rm-specic risk, collateral ability, and industrial
structure that may be relevant for bank lending decisions.42 To assess the importance of nan-
cial constraints, we include one-period lagged average tax rate (avgt 1) and its interaction with
40Conclusions based on regression results in Table 5 panel B are qualitatively the same.
41See, for example, Nickell (1985) and Bond et al. (2003), for a detailed derivation of the error correction
model for rm-level investment analysis.
42Note that the parameter  reects the speed of adjustment of the capital stock towards its long-run
level, assuming that desired capital stock in the presence of adjustment costs is proportional to the desired
capital stock in the absence of adjustment costs. A key property of  is that it should be positive, implying
that rms with a capital stock level below their target will adjust upwards and vice versa.
21
the number of years since incorporation (xit).43 Identication relies on the cross-sectional
variation in changes in CoCit and in 
avg
i;t 1 given that only companies with taxable prots
below £ 50,000 were primarily a¤ected by the 2006 tax reform.44
The lagged average tax rate in equation (17) measures exogenous shocks to internal funds
due to the tax reform, which allows us to test whether rmsinvestment tends to be more
sensitive to its cash ow in the presence of nancial constraints in the spirit of Fazzari,
Hubbard and Petersen (1988). The key advantage of using avgi;t 1 is that it represents a
windfall change in internal funds due to exogenous variation in the total tax payment, which
only arises when actual taxes are paid nine months after the accounting year end and thus
should be uncorrelated with any change in rm-specic investment opportunities. This is
similar to the approach used in Blanchard, de Silanes and Shleifer (1994), Lamont (1997),
and Rauh (2006) which show convincingly that corporate investment respond to plausibly
exogenous shocks to a rms cash ow. The coe¢ cient b1 measures the extent of nancing
constraints faced by the average company in the sample and is predicted to be negative. We
allow the e¤ect of taxes to vary continuously with the duration of incorporation by including
the interaction term avgi;t 1  xit. A positive coe¢ cient b2 would imply a decreasing e¤ect of
nancial constraints on investment over the period since incorporation.
Our identication relies on the di¤erential changes in the average tax rate for small
companies following the 2006/07 tax reform, which may have a¤ected investment through
two channelsby changing the cost of capital and by reducing the availability of cash due
to a higher tax liability for nancially constrained companies. The change in the cost of
capital, as summarized in panel A of Figure 5, is the rst and more conventional channel
through which the tax reform may a¤ect small company investment. Due to di¤erential
changes in the marginal tax rate across companies with di¤erent pre-tax prots, the cost
of capital increased by 0.7 percentage points for those with taxable prots below £ 10,000,
fell by 0.3 percentage points for taxable prots between £ 10,000 and £ 50,000, and remained
unchanged for taxable prots above £ 50,000. These e¤ects on the cost of capital are rather
small.
We thus focus primarily on the cash ow e¤ect of the tax reform, which arises from
a higher tax liability for liquidity constrained rms. Panel B of Figure 5 shows that the
increased tax liability leaves less internal funds available for investment for companies with
taxable prots up to £ 50,000.45 The di¤erential changes in the tax liability imply that
43For each company, xit is reported in company accounts and measures the duration of incorporation.
This is an empirical proxy for xit in Section 2, which is more general and captures the overall e¤ect of
incorporation.
44By including the average tax rate in levels, we take the view that internal funds enter the model only
to account for short-term nancial constraints and should only a¤ect the timing of investment along the
transition path between steady states.
45Unlike the discrete increase in the cost of capital, the increase in the tax liability is piecewise continuous
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companies with prots up to £ 50,000 are a natural treatment group whose internal funds
were reduced by the 2006/07 tax reform, relative to the control group of small companies
with taxable prots just above £ 50,000 which had the same tax position.
6.2 Basic Findings
Table 6 presents regression results from various specications based on equation (17), where
the dependent variable is the qualifying expenditure on plant and machinery scaled by
beginning-of-period xed assets (It=Kt 1). We impose the constant return to scale restriction
throughout by including ln(K=Y )t 1 as one control variable instead of two separate terms
ln(Kt 1) and ln(Yt 1). This is to reduce potential collinearity between the average tax rate
and the output, which partially determines the level of the average tax rate. All regressions
include a set of rm and year xed e¤ects. Heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors are
clustered at the rm level.46
Column (1) reports a negative and signicant e¤ect of the tax-related cash ow on in-
vestment, and is robust to controlling for the duration of incorporation and the amount
of non-tax cash ow in column (2). In both columns variation in the user cost of capital
is controlled for with time-specic and rm-specic xed e¤ects. The estimated e¤ects of
conventional determinants of investment are highly signicant and consistent with the basic
neoclassical investment model. In particular, there is a signicant and moderate adjustment
of investment to reach the long-run target level of capital stock as indicated by the strong
and negative coe¢ cient of ln(K=Y )t 1.
Column (3) adds avgi;t 1  xit and tests whether the e¤ect of the tax cash ow diminishes
over the duration of incorporation. The estimated coe¢ cient b2 is positive and highly signi-
cant, while the coe¢ cient b1 remains negative. Taken together, the results suggest that the
negative e¤ect of nancial constraints is most pronounced for new companies.47 Evaluated
at the mean tax rate, a one percentage point increase in the average tax rate would decrease
the investment rate of newly incorporated rms (i.e. xit = 1) by around 0.26 percentage
points. The negative cash ow e¤ect of taxes on investment decreases by about 0.01 per-
centage point for each year the rm remains incorporated, so that there is no signicant
impact of the tax-related cash ow on investment for those remain incorporated more than
25 years.48 Quantitatively, on average newly incorporated rms allocate 90 pence of every
with the largest increase occurring at £ 10,000.
46We also examine the cash-ow e¤ect of taxes on investment in a reduced-form stationary specication
and the results are very similar and available upon request.
47We also test for possible nonlinearity in the relationship between investment and the nancial constraints
by including a quadratic term x2t and interacting with 
avg
t 1. The basic ndings remain unchanged, while the
coe¢ cient on avgt 1  x2t is small (bavgt 1x2t =  0:00001) and imprecisely estimated.
48An alternative interpretation of the negative coe¢ cient might be that as companies grow they start to
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pound in their tax saving to investment in the investor sample.49
Column (4) assesses the robustness of the estimates by including a control for the user
cost of capital. While both the short-run and long-run e¤ects of the cost of capital are
estimated to be negative and highly signicant, controlling for the cost of capital leaves the
basic nding of a diminishing investment sensitivity to tax-related cash ow unchanged.
Column (5) in Table 6 checks the robustness of the ndings to controlling for non-tax
determinants of investment. While a change in the average tax rate due to the tax reform
implies an exogenous change in rm cash savings, the average tax rate might serve as a proxy
for other omitted variables that are potential determinants of investment opportunities. For
example, since the average tax rate also depends on a companys protability, a positive
coe¢ cient on avgi;t 1  xit may reect that over time as a company becomes more protable
and has a larger cash balance. To rule out this alternative explanation, column (5) adds
one-period lagged protability, the long-term growth rate of sales50, and their interactions
with xit. Once again, the basic ndings on the e¤ect of incorporation on investment remains
unchanged.
The last two columns in Table 6 use alternative samples and conrm the robustness of
the estimates in the frequent investors (column (6)) and consistent investors (column (7))
samples. Quantitatively, our ndings suggest that on average companies in the consistent
investor sample allocate 24 pence of £ 1 of tax savings to investment, with newly incorporated
rms in this sample on average allocating 75 pence of £ 1 of their tax saving in the rst year of
incorporation. While this is a strong e¤ect, it is somewhat smaller than that for the baseline
investor sample, indicating that nancial constraints may also have an impact on investment
at the extensive margin and that the infrequency of investment by small companies may
partly be due to lack of available funds.
have access to alternative channels of external nance including bond issuance and become less dependent
on banks. While this argument may be relevant for the U.S. capital market, it is unlikely to be relevant for
companies in our data as the minimum issue size for corporate bonds in the UK is around £ 100-200 million.
49For every rm in the sample of consistent investors, we calculate the increase in taxable prot as a result
of one percentage point increase in the average tax rate. The rm-level increase in taxable prot measures
the decrease in the total cash ow due to tax reform. We then scale the increase in taxable prot with one-
period lagged xed asset. The corresponding average decrease in investment rate is around 0.18. Dividing
this coe¢ cient by the average increase in the taxable prot scaled by lagged xed asset gives an estimate
of 0.24, suggesting that for each pound of increase in the tax bill, the average decrease in investment for all
rms that invest consistently is around 0.24 pound.
50The long-term sales growth rate is calculated as the average sales growth rate in the last three years, or
the average sales growth rate over the last two years for younger rms with missing sales growth rate from
three years ago.
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6.3 Controlling for Pre-Incorporation Firm Size
Ultimately, we aim to identify the e¤ect of incorporation on small business investment
through gradually relaxing their nancial constraints after becoming incorporated. This
e¤ect should be independent of the e¤ect of the number of years the rm has been estab-
lished before incorporation. This raises a concern that our measure of the period since
incorporation may be correlated with the total age of the business, including any period of
non-incorporation. One way to test for this would be to include the age of the business
at incorporation, and also interact that with the lagged cash ow term. However, we do
not observe rm age at incorporation. Instead, we attempt to control for, and estimate
indirectly, the e¤ect of years pre-incorporation on investment by including proxies for age
at incorporation. We use measures of rm size at incorporation, SIi , measured by sales and
xed assets. Empirically, we estimate:
Iit
Kit 1
= 0 + 1 lnYit   2 lnCoCit   (lnKit 1   lnYit 1    lnCoCit 1) (18)
+b1xit + b2 it 1 + b3SIi  it 1 + b4xit it 1 + dt + i + uit;
where SIi is subsumed in the rm xed e¤ect i. Note that because we are using a proxy
for age at incorporation, the estimated coe¢ cients bb3 and bb4 are not directly comparable in
magnitude. The regression sample used to estimate equation (18) are rms that are newly
incorporated since 2002, for which we observe the size of their initial turnover (Y 0) and xed
assets (K0) at the point of incorporation.
Table 7 presents regressions of the form in equation (18). Column (1) reports the e¤ects
of the average tax rate without controlling for SIi  it 1. The results conrm the basic ndings
of a diminishing tax sensitivity of investment over the period of incorporation in the newly
incorporated sample, similar to ndings using the main investor sample in Table 6. Having
a corporate form seems to have a stronger e¤ect in relaxing nancial constraints for newly
incorporated rm, as indicated by the strong and positive coe¢ cient estimate bb4. The next
column adds xit it 1 as an additional control and shows that both the initial rm size and
the number of years post-incorporation alleviate the negative cash ow e¤ect of taxes on
investment. The results are robust to using initial xed asset (K0) to measure SI in column
(3), where the size of coe¢ cient bb4 was una¤ected.
The relative size of the coe¢ cients indicates that the e¤ect of the number of years post-
incorporation in easing nancial constraints dominates the e¤ect of years in business prior
to incorporation. To see this, rst note that based on the results in Table 7 column (3),
the marginal e¤ect of one more year post-incorporation on investment is 0:138 it 1, whereas
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the marginal e¤ect of one unit increase in Y 0 on investment is 0:116 it 1. Given that the
average initial turnover for newly incorporated rms is £ 0.292 million, a 10% increase in the
average Y 0 implies a marginal e¤ect on investment of about 0:003 it 1. This is considerably
smaller than the e¤ect of one more year post incorporation in relaxing nancial constraints.
In an extreme case where the average initial sales of a new company doubles from £ 0.29
to £ 0.58 million, this translates to a marginal e¤ect on investment of 0:03 it 1, which even
then is four times smaller than the average e¤ect of one more year post incorporation on
investment.
6.4 Investment Responses by Minimizer Type
As discussed above, our empirical estimation identies the e¤ect of incorporation on in-
vestment by relaxing the extent of nancing constraints faced by the average company in
the sample. This is an average e¤ect, and may not hold for tax-sophiscated companies if
they only respond to the tax saving by changing their legal form without changing their
real economic activities. For example, tax minimizersmay cash out all their tax savings
rather than use them to fund investment. To see whether this is the case, we test whether
the investment response to tax rates by minimizersis systematically di¤erent from non-
minimizers. We do so in a di¤erence-in-di¤erences setting by augmenting equation (17)
with additional terms avgi;t 1 Minimizerit and avgi;t 1  xit Minimizerit. In this setting, the
coe¢ cient on avgi;t 1 Minimizerit can be interpreted as the di¤erential e¤ect of a change
in lagged taxes on investment by minimizers. The coe¢ cient on avgi;t 1  xit Minimizerit
shows whether there is any di¤erence in the extent of reduction in the e¤ect of taxes on
investment between the minimizersand non-minimizers. We perform this test in three
samples of di¤erent investment frequency.
Table 8 summarizes the regression results. Column (1) is based on the investor sample
and shows that the coe¢ cient on avgi;t 1  xit Minimizerit is insignicant, indicating that
the rate of diminishing nancial constraints over the lifetime of incorporation is quite similar
between the two groups. Column (2) shows a similar result by controlling for the user cost of
capital. Columns (3)-(6) in Table 8 present the regression results using the frequent investors
(columns (3)-(4)) and consistent investors (columns (5)-(6)) sample. We continue to nd
a negative and diminishing cash ow e¤ect of taxes on investment in both samples. The
excess sensitivity of investment to taxes does not di¤er signicantly between minimizers and
non-minimizers, and the nding is robust to controlling for the user cost of capital in columns
(4) and (6).
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7 Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the e¤ect of incorporation in stimulating small business investment,
and also the related e¤ect of taxation. We provide evidence that a higher corporation tax
rate introduced in the UK in 2006 reduced the number of unincorporated rms choosing
to switch to corporate form. We also provide evidence that small companies responded
to the exogenous rise in their tax payment by reducing investment, indicating that their
investment was constrained by available internal funds. And we show that this e¤ect was
most pronounced for newly incorporated rms, and diminished gradually over the period
since incorporation.
The heterogeneous e¤ect of tax on investment for companies with di¤erent durations
since incorporation is consistent with a positive relationship between incorporation and in-
vestment. Incorporation lowers the cost of external nance for small businesses by improv-
ing their information and reputation, so that the availability of internal funds becomes less
important for more established companies. The positive link between incorporation and
easier accesses to external nance is also directly corroborated in our survey evidence. In
consequence, our ndings imply real welfare improvement associated with small business
incorporation.
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Figure 1. Tax Consequences of Abolishing the Zero Starting Rate
A: Changes in the Average Tax Rate
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B: Changes in the Marginal Tax Rate
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Notes: The panels A and B plot the average and marginal tax rate for companies with
taxable prots up to £ 150,000, before and after the abolition of the zero starting rate in
2006/07, respectively. The zero starting rate, which was in place between 2002/03 and
2005/06, exempted the rst £ 10,000 of corporate prots from tax.
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Figure 2. The Tax Gain from Incorporation in the UK
A: Retained Earnings
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B: Distributed Dividends
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Notes: The panels A and B plot the tax gain from incorporation for small businesses as a
percentage of their pre-tax income. The tax gain from incorporation is computed as the
di¤erence between the average tax rate for self-employment income and the average tax rate
for corporate prot, i.e. avgU   avgC . Panel A assumes that all prots within the company
are retained earnings, while Panel B assumes that all prots are paid out to the shareholders
in dividends.
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Figure 3. Distribution of Newly Incorporated Companies
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The gure shows the observed distribution of the pre-tax prots for companies incorporated
in 2002/03-2003/04 (solid line) and in 2006/07-2007/08 (smooth line).
Figure 4. Tax Minimization by Bunching in DirectorsSalary
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Notes: The gure shows in solid line the empirical distribution of salaries and wages paid to
directors in companies that incorporated in 2002/03-2008/09. The total taxable income in
these new companies range between £ 0 and £ 100,000, and is dened as the sum of pre-tax
corporate prots and salaries and wages received by their directors. The rst vertical dashed
line denotes the amount of the basic personal allowance, which remained the same in nominal
terms during the sample period. The second vertical dashed line denotes twice the amount
of the basic personal allowance. Paying a salary in this amount can minimize the total tax
liability of companies with joint directors (often as husband and wife).
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Figure 5. Changing Tax Incentives for Corporate Investment
A: Changes in the Cost of Capital
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Notes: The panels A and B show changes in the tax incentives for corporate investment.
Panel A compares the user cost of capital for companies with taxable prot up to £ 150,000
before and after the abolition of the zero starting rate in 2006/07. Panel B plots the post-2006
increase in the overall tax liability for companies with taxable prot up to £ 150,000.
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Table 1. Likelihood of Failure in Obtaining External Finance: Marginal E¤ects
Dependent variable: Overall Failure Denied Depressed Discouraged
(1) (2) (3) (4)
LLC -0.117*** -0.049* -0.032 -0.029*
(0.040) (0.028) (0.026) (0.018)
Firm age -0.003** -0.001 -0.003* -0.002*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
LLC  Age 0.003* 0.001 0.003** 0.001*
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Total Asset ($mils) -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.005***
(0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0003) (0.0013)
Year FE Y Y Y Y
Industry FE Y Y Y Y
Pseudo R2 0.046 0.025 0.026 0.135
N 1,056 1,056 1,056 1,056
Notes: The dependent variables are outcome indicators of whether the SME was
successful in obtaining su¢ cient external nance. The indicator Denied takes value
of 1 if the SME applied to a bank or nancial institution for any overdraft or
commercial lending and was turned down outright, and 0 otherwise. The dummy
variable Depressed takes value of 1 if the SME was o¤ered less than what was
requested for external nance, and 0 otherwise. The indicator Discouraged equals
1 if the SME did not apply for any external nance in the fear of being turned down,
and 0 otherwise. The indicator Overall Failure is the sum of the three indicators
and takes value of 1 if any of them is nonzero. The estimation sample includes rms
that have indicated need of external nance in the 2008 and 2009 surveys of UK
SME nance. ***, **, * denotes signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Standard errors are clustered at rm level and reported in parenthesis.
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Table 5. Heterogeneous Incorporation Responses to the Tax Saving
All Firms All Firms Tax Minimizers Non-Minimizers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A:
Tax Gainre 0.027*** 0.079*** 0.021***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Tax Gainre Minimizer 0.035***
(0.004)
Tax Gainre Non Minimizer 0.024***
(0.002)
Minimizer -1.025*** -1.143***
(0.013) (0.053)
Panel B:
Tax Gaindiv 0.022*** 0.065*** 0.019***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Tax Gaindiv Minimizer 0.045***
(0.003)
Tax Gaindiv Non Minimizer 0.015***
(0.001)
Minimizer -0.995*** -1.218***
(0.013) (0.032)
Additional Variables Included:
Income Bin Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed E¤ects Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of Observations 10,195 10,195 4,580 5,589
No. of Income Bins 941 941 910 941
Notes: This table presents regression results based on the Poisson Pseudo-MLE model.
The regression sample includes all rms with non-missing directorssalary, which allows
us to distinguish between tax minimizers and non-minimizers. The dependent variable
is the number of newly incorporated rms by type of tax minimizers in total taxable
income bins of £ 100 up to £ 150,000. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are listed
in brackets. ***, **, * denotes signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 7. Excess Sensitivity of Investment: Controlling for Initial Company Size
(1) (2) (3)
4 lnYt 0.278*** 0.278*** 0.279***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
ln(K=Y )t 1 -0.416*** -0.416*** -0.416***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
avg;t 1 -0.855*** -0.872*** -0.842***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
avg;t 1  xt 0.138*** 0.138*** 0.137***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
avg;t 1  Y0 0.116***
(0.026)
avg;t 1 K0 0.206***
(0.079)
CFt=Kt 1 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Aget -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.079***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
R2 0.223 0.223 0.222
No. of Observations 1,039,307 1,039,307 954,699
Notes: This table presents regression results from the error-correction model of investment
based on equation (17). The dependent variable is the qualifying investment on plant and
machinery scaled by beginning-of-period xed asset. Y0 is the amount of turnover (in £ million)
in the year of incorporation. K0 is the amount of xed assets (in £ million) in the year of
incorporation. The regression sample includes all rms that incorporated since 2002 and have
some positive qualifying investment during the sample period. All regressions include a set of
rm and year xed e¤ects. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at rm level
are listed in brackets. ***, **, * denotes signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 8. Excess Sensitivity of Investment: Tax Minimizers vs. Non-Minimizers
Sample: Investors Frequent Investors Consistent Investors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
4 lnYt 0.240*** 0.249*** 0.289*** 0.296*** 0.335*** 0.338***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
 lnCoCt -6.684*** -6.680*** -3.023***
(0.100) (0.124) (0.212)
ln(K=Y )t 1 -0.344*** -0.338*** -0.412*** -0.407*** -0.467*** -0.457***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003)
lnCoCt 1 -5.136*** -5.028*** -2.114***
(0.194) (0.248) (0.442)
avg;t 1 -0.252*** -0.389*** -0.261*** -0.422*** -0.188*** -0.298***
(0.030) (0.036) (0.036) (0.044) (0.038) (0.073)
avg;t 1 -0.066 -0.056 -0.08 -0.072 -0.104 -0.107
Minimizer (0.050) (0.049) (0.064) (0.063) (0.108) (0.108)
avg;t 1  xt 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.05*** 0.005***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
avg;t 1  xt 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.002
Minimizer (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009)
xt -0.043*** -0.040*** -0.043*** -0.041*** -0.038*** -0.041***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002)
CFt=Kt 1 0.004*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.006***
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
R2 0.18 0.18 0.227 0.243 0.274 0.277
No. of Observations 371,924 371,924 256,389 256,389 78,033 78,033
Notes: This table presents regression results from the error-correction model of investment based
on equation (17). The dependent variable is the qualifying investment on plant and machinery
scaled by beginning-of-period xed asset. minimizer is a dummy indicator that takes value of 1 if
the company uses an income allocation strategy to minimize its overall tax liability. The frequent
investor sample includes rms with non-missing directorssalary and invested in more than half
of the periods throughout their lifetime during the sample period. The consistent investor sample
includes rms with non-missing directors salary and invested in every period throughout their
lifetime during the sample period. All regressions include a set of rm and year xed e¤ects.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered at rm level are listed in brackets. ***, **, *
denotes signicance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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For Online Publication
A Calculation of the User Cost of Capital
The Jorgenson and Hall (1967) cost of capital for new investment nanced by retained
earnings is computed as:
CoCit = (r + )
(1  Aitmrgit )
(1  mrgit )
; (19)
where r is the real interest rate,  the economic depreciation rate for plant and machinery,
Ait the net present value of depreciation allowances, and 
mrg
it is the statutory marginal
corporation tax rate.
We assume common values of r = 0:05 and  = 0:175 with any variation across time or
companies being controlled for using year dummies and rm xed e¤ects. The rm-specic
tax component of the cost of capital, (1   Aitmrgit )=(1   mrgit ), captures variation in the
marginal tax rate and depreciation allowance over the sample period. The key variation
that we focus on is the post-2006 di¤erential changes in mrgit across di¤erent prot bands
as shown in Figure 1 panel B. We use additional variation in Ait due to variation in capital
allowances.
B Supplementary Exhibits
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